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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
In the eye of the beholder: to make global health estimates useful, make
them more socially robust
Elizabeth Pisania and Maarten Kokb,c
aThe Policy Institute, King’s College London; bInstitute for Health Policy and Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam; cTalma
Institute, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
ABSTRACT
A plethora of new development goals and funding institutions have greatly increased the
demand for internationally comparable health estimates in recent years, and have brought
important new players into the field of health estimate production. These changes have
rekindled debates about the validity and legitimacy of global health estimates. This paper
draws on country case studies and personal experience to support our opinion that the
production and use of estimates are deeply embedded in specific social, economic, political
and ideational contexts, which differ at different levels of the global health architecture.
Broadly, most global health estimates tend to be made far from the local contexts in
which the data upon which they are based are collected, and where the results of estimation
processes must ultimately be used if they are to make a difference to the health of indivi-
duals. Internationally standardised indicators are necessary, but they are no substitute for
data that meet local needs, and that fit with local ideas of what is credible and useful. In other
words, data that are both technically and socially robust for those who make key decisions
about health.
We suggest that greater engagement of local actors (and local data) in the formulation,
communication and interpretation of health estimates would increase the likelihood that
these data will be used by those most able to translate them into health gains for the longer
term. Besides strengthening national information systems, this requires ongoing interaction,
building trust and establishing a communicative infrastructure. Local capacities to use knowl-
edge to improve health must be supported.
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Background
The validity and legitimacy of global health estimates
have been a topic of debate for at least two decades
[1–5], but it was the Global Burden of Disease esti-
mates of 2010 that really set the discussions alight.
The publication by the Institute for Health Metrics
and Evaluation (IHME) of estimates for the burden of
very many diseases in very many countries drew
sharp responses, in two waves. The first wave focused
largely on technical issues. Academics and health
officials from several countries were confronted with
estimates they found hard to reconcile with the facts
as they saw them; this led to many questions about
data sources [6–10]. Experts working globally on
specific disease areas questioned methods, complain-
ing that they could not see the workings inside the
‘black box’ of IHME models [3,11]. Rumbling under
both of these areas of concern was a larger discom-
fort, which built into a second wave of responses,
questioning power relationships in global health.
The second wave of responses focused mostly on
social issues, such as the role of health estimates in
shaping the global health agenda. Who is making the
estimates, and by what right? How ‘robust’ are they,
and how ‘legitimate’ [12–20]? Several contributors to
this debate recognised that data and concepts in
global health are institutionally and politically con-
structed: a health issue rises up the international
agenda because people deemed to be experts have
used accepted methods to demonstrate its impor-
tance, and have communicated that in forums
which entrench that importance (and which influence
funding decisions). But there has been less discussion
of how these constructions come about. Who desig-
nates the experts? Which methods are considered
robust? Which forums confer legitimacy to commu-
nicated data? Whose funding decisions are
influenced?
A few authors have argued that the political legiti-
macy and technical validity of global health estimates
would be improved if estimation processes worked
from the bottom up [2,11,20]. However most of the
debate so far has centred on the interests of institu-
tions and individuals who work at a supranational
level, as though ‘global health’ were in some way
independent of the health of billions of individuals
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living in specific local and national settings, as though
global health estimates were independent of data
collected by people and institutions in very concrete
contexts. We believe that health data and estimates at
any level are only useful if they are demonstrably
used to improve the health of individuals other than
those (including ourselves) who make a comfortable
living out of the health estimates industry. We thus
turn our attention to what makes health estimates
useable, and useful.
In this opinion paper, we draw on the country case
studies presented in this volume, on our own work in
countries as diverse as China, Indonesia and Ghana,
and on discussions with health officials from middle-
income countries and international organisations
described at greater length in this volume by Abou-
Zahr and Boerma, to examine which health data
prompt changes that lead to better health [21].
(Phrases in italics are verbatim quotes from discus-
sants.) We argue that health estimates are deeply
embedded in specific social, economic, political and
ideational contexts that differ at different levels of the
global health architecture [22]. What is considered
legitimate, robust and useful thus differs also. We
introduce the concept of ‘social robustness’ and sug-
gest ways in which these different norms might be
aligned so that the needs of different actors can be
met without undermining one another.
What makes estimates ‘robust’?
Commonalities across contexts
Health data, including estimates, are produced by a
variety of organisations whose mandates, aims, incen-
tive structures and institutional cultures differ. These
differences shape both the processes through which
data are collected and analysed, and the interpreta-
tion of the results. Health data are often presented as
‘objective’, but like all other knowledge they are a
construct that derives meaning from the very process
of its construction.
This process of construction, the interpretation of
data and their perceived utility are shaped by the
actors involved, their priorities and the institutions
and circumstances in which they are embedded.
Institutional priorities are themselves shaped by simi-
lar (often interacting) factors. The most salient ques-
tions to ask in understanding how and why priorities
relating to the production of knowledge may differ
include the following.
Who chooses the questions, and what’s their
goal?
Data are produced in response to some perceived
need, which must be articulated in questions that
determine what data are collected, and in analyses
determining how they will be understood. Those
choosing the questions may or may not be the end
users of the data; but their interests and aims will
certainly influence the utility of the data to all poten-
tial users.
Who pays for the data collection and knowledge
production?
The source of funding often (though not always)
strongly influences the questions that get asked, and
the ways in which they get answered [23,24]. Health
authorities may need to take into account the inter-
ests and concerns of tax-payers, politicians or exter-
nal funding agencies in planning knowledge
production; these interests can lead to the overem-
phasis or neglect of different types of information,
health issues and populations.
Who produces the data/knowledge?
Data and knowledge producers are driven by a vari-
ety of personal, professional and institutional incen-
tives: the reward system for academics has little in
common with that of national health authorities.
These differences can affect the timing as well as the
nature of knowledge production.
Box 1. The pillars of socially robust knowledge
The ‘robustness’ of a knowledge claim is similar to that of other
constructions, such as a bridge. The more well-constructed
pillars there are supporting a bridge, the more likely it is to be
robust. Our confidence in the construction is increased after the
bridge has been tested by a variety of vehicles in different
weather conditions.
Scientific knowledge is also constructed: the solidity of scientific
achievements is a matter of alignment between data,
arguments, interests, dominant values and circumstances [41].
The quality and validity of knowledge are made, and the
‘robustness’ of such constructions is tested, through ongoing
debate, new research and the challenges that arise when the
knowledge is acted upon.
Scientists tend to consider a knowledge claim more robust when it
is based upon more and increasingly specific data, and
constructed using ever-improving technical methods. Scientific
standards and norms are not always universally agreed even
within the scientific community, however, hence the importance
of transparency about methods and data, which allows others to
test a knowledge claim.
Once the ‘knowledge’ produced by scientists migrates outside of
the research community, it faces a broader challenge: it must
link up to what matters for those people who make decisions
about health policy and practice in concrete local circumstances.
In other words, it will be tested against social as well as scientific
standards. If those standards have been taken into account
when designing the pillars that underpin the new construction,
that knowledge will function better in the real world.
Knowledge is always linked to concrete practices and institutions,
and has to be understood, accepted and trusted by real people
in the broader context of their daily lives and beliefs. As Figure 2
illustrates, knowledge becomes more socially robust when more
people, from more diverse communities and institutions with a
wider variety of worldviews and practices, understand, accept
and trust it, and find it useful for their own aims in their own
situation.
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How are the data communicated, by whom, to
whom?
Communication is an inherent part of the process of
knowledge production; it confers meaning on raw
information. The perceived credibility of health data
is very much influenced by the format of its commu-
nication, the communicator, and the interaction
between the communicator and the audiences, each
of which will understand the data within the frame-
work of their existing worldview.
How are the data used, by whom and for whom?
The same data can acquire meaning and utility in
various ways that are not always consistent with the
aims of their producers.
Though the constellation of actors and factors
involved in producing data is by definition locally
specific and deeply contextual, it does tend to man-
ifest in broadly ‘typical’ patterns for different data
producers at different levels of the global health
architecture. Next, we examine three typical constel-
lations and suggest how they affect the perceived
legitimacy of data outputs, and their utility.
Sub-national and national levels
At country level, the most important function of
health data is to inform the prospective planning
and continual evaluation and adjustment of health
service provision. While questions may be deter-
mined at the national level, data are most commonly
used at the sub-national level: ‘For us, the national is
nothing’ (health official, Latin America).
In middle- and higher-income countries, sub-
national data collection is part of the routine function
of health systems funded out of routine government
spending. In low-income countries they may be
externally funded through international survey pro-
grammes such as the Demographic and Health
Surveys (DHS) or the Multi-Indicator Cluster
Surveys. These surveys, like routine data collection,
are generally carried out by government staff. This
creates an institutional imperative to use the data:
they are locally owned, produced by colleagues who
may be directly involved in communicating results
and who can help explain anomalies in the data and
their meaning in the specific local situation [25].
These empirical data are seen as robust in that they
are concrete, easy to interpret and directly relevant to
the local context [26]. However, survey data are rarely
representative at the district level at which decisions
about service provision are increasingly being made.
The idea of the ‘concrete’ affects the communica-
tion of sub-national and national data. Since they are
often empirical measures or simple adjusted
measures, sub-national and national health data are
commonly presented ‘as is’, with limited recognition
of the uncertainty associated with the measures.
Complex modelled estimates of the type produced
by international agencies do include measures of
uncertainty, but they are seen by national policy-
makers as the product of smoke and mirrors, and
mistrusted. ‘If you’ve just done a DHS, you don’t
really want to hear about an estimate’ (health official,
Africa). They are also seen by national authorities as
complicating the communication of health data: ‘I
can’t say in parliament or to the media that the
indicator is either 40% or 100%. That implies that
we don’t know. It’s just not possible. We pick a
number and that’s it. We’re certain’ (health official,
Latin America).
The media, for their part, are not always convinced
by this certainty. They understand that in-country
data producers are themselves embedded in a politi-
cal system, and are often under strong pressure to
report statistics that support the political powers of
the day. ‘If the national policy is to expand ARV
[antiretroviral] coverage, well, it is hard to interpret
[the data] against that’ (health official, Asia).
National interest can also affect the likelihood that
data will be communicated at all, especially in the
case of infectious disease outbreaks. Severe acute
respiratory syndrome, avian influenza, cholera and
Ebola all provide examples in which countries were
initially reluctant to share health data with global
health authorities because they feared the economic,
social and political consequences that can come with
containment measures.
Of all the types of knowledge produced, locally
determined empirical measures are most likely to be
used in ways that directly affect health service provi-
sion. They can sometimes be aggregated upwards to
meet national and international needs, although local
specificities do not always map neatly onto the stan-
dardised, comparable measures required at other
levels of the global health architecture.
International organisations
United Nations (UN) organisations, and especially
the World Health Organization (WHO), are man-
dated by their member states to track the state of
health internationally. The information they generate
falls into two broad categories: occasional ‘tours
d’horizon’ of issues of current interest, and regular
reporting on key indicators. The appetite for both has
grown enormously in recent years, in the former case
because voluntary bilateral and philanthropic donors
now provide over three quarters of the institution’s
annual budget, and make demands of it according to
their particular interests. One year, national health
ministries will be bombarded with requests for data
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about drowning. Another year, the demand may be
for data about dental or mental health [27–29]. We
are not aware of any rigorous evaluations of the costs
of these focused estimation exercises, nor of their
policy outcomes at the national level.
The regular reporting of internationally agreed
indicators such as the Sustainable Development
Goals has become the bread and butter of statisticians
at the WHO and other specialist UN agencies. There
is a huge demand for these estimates, which involve
the regular publication of standardised indicators that
allow all UN member states to be compared at a
single point in time. Organisations that fund devel-
opment efforts demand indicators with a regularity
incompatible with lengthy consultation. They also
want a level of comparability not easily achieved
given the diversity (and sometimes the sheer absence)
of underlying data. The estimation process is fiercely
political, because the results of these estimates are
used to ‘grade’ country progress towards agreed
goals, and to rank the relative importance of condi-
tions in which money will be invested and in which
different institutions – including within the UN
‘family’ – have an interest.
The types of data produced by the WHO and some
other specialist UN organisations are greatly influ-
enced by a mandate that goes beyond the simple
compilation of country-reported statistics: these orga-
nisations seek to add value through technical advice.
This institutional culture has led to a huge investment
of time and energy in developing health estimates
that are technically robust. Together with the impera-
tive to publish comparable statistics on a very regular
basis, this focus on the technical has undermined
consultation and other social processes which might
increase the utility and uptake of data at the national
level.
Currently, international organisations most com-
monly communicate data in published reports that
are positioned for maximum public exposure, includ-
ing through the media. The media, which see the
WHO and other UN organisations as the repositories
of technical expertise, generally oblige. National
authorities, however, are sometimes blind-sided by
internationally comparable estimates, which often
derive from a country consultation that is little
more than cursory, and that differ from the figures
used locally. National authorities are sometimes
unable to respond appropriately because they do not
understand the ‘black box’ which produced the data.
The WHO and other producers of health estimates
are actually rather transparent about their methods,
making them available on websites and sometimes
publishing them in the scientific literature. However
these publications are usually highly technical, often
only in English, and rarely give details of country-
level adjustments. A health official from Europe
expressed frustration at international organisations’
failure to consult with or explain their methods to
national experts:
They ask for data from us, and then they publish
without even showing us first, without a chance to
give feedback. . . We were told there was no new data
[used in the estimates], only the quality assessment
had changed. But there were no methodology notes
that told us how or why.
Internationally standardised health data (including
those produced by standardised surveys and aca-
demic institutions, to be described later) are most
useful to development agencies including large pri-
vate foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation, multi-funder organisations such as
Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria and bilateral
agencies such as the United States Agency for
International Development. Admirably, these institu-
tions want to identify areas of need and to compare
different investment opportunities, as well as to track
the health impact of initiatives they support. Indeed
the desire to increase accountability and show mea-
surable results has been a major driver of the huge
rise in demand for these sorts of data; some global
health funds use these estimates not just to guide the
allocation of resources but to withdraw funding if
countries don’t meet numerical targets set and mea-
sured through internationally produced estimates.
National governments also use externally made
estimates as stop-gaps for areas which have been
relatively neglected by local health information sys-
tems, and as an advocacy tool: ‘Global estimates are
completely useless for planning, but they are useful
for political lobbying’ (health official, Latin America).
Benchmarking national progress using global com-
parisons can help secure continued support from
national authorities for successful programmes.
Academic institutions
Academic institutions have long collaborated with
national health authorities in generating health-
related data and knowledge, and international orga-
nisations have also sought advice from academics in
developing methods and estimates. In these instances,
academics answer questions posed by their partners.
Many also develop research agendas driven by their
personal interests.
More recently, specialised global health research
institutions situated within academic institutions
have become important producers of health estimates
and statistics, often in collaboration with UN and
other multi-country organisations. Examples include
the London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine, the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of
Public Health and the Norwegian Institute of Public
Health. The most significant recent arrival is the
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IHME, based at the University of Washington in
Seattle. IHME is funded primarily by the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation to the tune of some US$
35 million a year; the main thrust of its work to date
has been to produce the standardised and interna-
tionally comparable data that the private foundation
needs to inform its investment choices.
IHME is staffed by hundreds of well-trained data
scientists and analysts who have access to teraflops of
computer processing power; it is thus supremely well
placed to develop new data processing and statistical
modelling methods. Though feathers have been
ruffled, especially among the international organisa-
tions that had enjoyed a near monopoly on technical
expertise at the international level since global esti-
mates became fashionable in the 1990s, IHME has
done a great deal to push forward the technical fron-
tiers of health estimates production. To this extent,
their estimates compete with those of the WHO and
other international organisations to be considered the
most technically robust. Data produced by IHME and
other academic institutions have in some cases forced
actors in both governments and international organi-
sations to revisit their own data and methods, and to
make both more transparent.
Academic researchers are to a great extent driven
by the incentives of their profession, which reward
publishing papers in peer-reviewed journals, regard-
less of whether or not the data are used to improve
health outcomes. This necessarily influences the com-
munication of results. High-level, multi-country
comparisons have proven attractive to the editors of
high-profile journals, The Lancet in particular [30–
36]. Publication in these journals in turn imbues
academic estimates with a legitimacy that is not
shared by data produced at the country level.
When academic analyses are demand driven, for
example when national governments outsource their
data collection and analysis to academic institutions
or where there is a genuine collaboration between
academic institutions and end users, the results are
likely to be valued and used to influence a country’s
policy choices. In Ghana, for example, a detailed
impact assessment of 30 studies showed that research
was most likely to be used when it was aligned to
national priorities and led by people embedded in the
contexts in which results can be used [37].
Collaboration between academic, government and
civil society partners can also increase the credibility
of estimates in the public view, because citizens per-
ceive academics to be more objective than civil ser-
vants, while the inclusion of non-government voices
keeps the process ‘honest’. In Indonesia, for example,
HIV estimates made in Geneva at the start of this
decade were largely ignored by a government unin-
volved in their production. A national estimation
process led by the Ministry of Health but involving
academics, non-government organisations, the police,
the narcotics control board and others led to techni-
cally sound estimates that were widely accepted
because so many deeply disparate groups had con-
tributed data, argued over methods and agreed on the
outcome [38].
Increasingly, IHME is working with governments
to produce health estimates at the sub-national level –
China, Mexico and the United Kingdom are recent
examples. These are all countries with relatively
strong health information systems; they have the
data to produce meaningful local estimates, as well
as the indigenous capacity to interpret and use model
outputs. If countries such as these can learn from
academic organisations the skills needed to run
sophisticated models, the increased understanding
of national diversity that results will doubtless be
illuminating, and perhaps even be useful and used.
The same is not true when these models are used
by countries with poor data. Standardised models
that use estimated parameters to produce comparable
data for close to 200 countries inevitably iron out
precisely the differences and nuances that are most
important for local decision-making. Trying to cor-
rect for that by making sub-national estimates in
data-poor settings simply multiplies the likely
inaccuracies.
Utility, in the eye of the beholder
From the foregoing discussion, we see that health data
that are considered high quality and valid by some, are
considered more or less useless by others; we have
found this in our own experience, but it is reflected
also in the literature and in the widely differing opi-
nions that were expressed even within the discussion
which led to this paper. Figure 1 tries to summarise
graphically these opinions about how different poten-
tial users see health estimates made by knowledge
producers at various levels. We make a distinction
between credibility – the belief that an estimate pro-
vides a good approximation of reality – and utility –
the potential for the data to be acted upon in ways that
may contribute to improved health.
A traditional and technocratic view would hold
that data must be credible to be useful, and, further,
that if data do reflect reality, they are likely to be
useful. Decades of studies of the use of research have
shown that the relationship is not so simple [22].
Consider the example of a journalist who is aware
that an estimate in an academic report is the product
of guesstimated data adjusted using an assumed para-
meter. They may not find that estimate particularly
credible, but it may be useful to them because it
provides comparability and comes with seductive
visualisations. Another example: consider the case of
local health officials who know that estimates made
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by academics are far more accurate than their own
official reports, but who are unable to act on the
‘credible’ data because of local political constraints
(a situation which arose, for example, during the
outbreak of HIV among plasma donors in central
China [39]).
The extent to which data are believed and used
depends not just on their technical quality. It depends
also on whether and how data are communicated to
users; on whether and how those users trust the
source of, understand and accept the data; and on
the extent to which they have the capacity to combine
data with existing knowledge and give meaning to
them for their specific aims in their specific local
situation [37,40]. These processes are in turn shaped
on the demand side by the political and institutional
cultures of potential users and their perceived need
for the data. On the supply side, they are shaped by
the constellation that is calling the shots intellectually,
financially and institutionally.
Local
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Figure 1. Perceived utility and credibility of health data and estimates to various users, by institutional level at which data are
produced.
Figure 2. A graphic representation of the robustness of knowledge.
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In short, the moment we become interested in the
actual use of data and their contribution to action, we
are forced to look beyond the technical and take into
account the social robustness of data. Technical
robustness is necessary, but it is not sufficient and
does not exist in a vacuum; without people who are
aware of, understand and accept data, they have no
meaning. When we take into account the socio-poli-
tical dimensions of knowledge, we are obliged to
confront the fact that narrowly technical processes
produce data that are only valued by very specific
groups in very specific situations.
Towards socially robust data
The perceived robustness of health data is, as we have
seen, a movable feast: different actors come to the
table with different needs, expectations and profes-
sional norms, both on the supply side and on the
demand side. In principle, there is no harm in the fact
that various producers are generating data to meet
the need of different consumers. Private organisa-
tions have every right to spend money supporting
the analysis they believe they need to guide invest-
ment decisions. International organisations are
bound to fulfil their mandates to provide member
states with comparable indicators of progress towards
internationally agreed goals. Countries inevitably
invest public money in generating the granular infor-
mation they need to plan and deliver health services
locally.
The problem arises when these processes duplicate
or, worse still, undermine one another; at the
moment, both are happening. Duplication occurs in
part because international organisations and aca-
demic groups driven by a seemingly implacable
need for comparable data are unwilling to accept
from countries contributions which do not meet glo-
bal definitions or standards. Using imputation and
other statistical techniques, they substitute estimates
made in Geneva or Seattle for those made in Ankara
or Pretoria. One must assume that the groups pub-
lishing these substitute estimates consider them to be
of better quality than the originals, perhaps because
they have been technically validated. But substitute
estimates are often made with minimal consultation
with the people who provided the data which were
fed into the maw of the multi-country model – peo-
ple who could point out specificities, biases or alter-
native data sources that should be considered in
interpreting the validity of the modelled outputs.
Academic researchers from one African country
gave an example: an international group estimated
mortality at a figure lower than the number of deaths
actually registered by the country’s incomplete vital
registration system. Local researchers suggested
adjustments to data inputs based on their own
granular knowledge of what is and is not captured
in national health statistics. ‘But we hit the roadblock
of one size fits all. We were told: “we can’t change
things just for [your country], it has to fit into this big
global model”’ (academic researcher, Africa).
Neither engaged in the process of making new
estimates nor fully understanding the complexity of
the model, people responsible for health data at the
local level have little incentive to push for action
based on the outcome. Where the substitute estimate
is better than the original, this represents a wasted
opportunity for learning and improvement at the
country level. But as long as countries have locally
driven data to fall back on, the existence of substitute
estimates is not fatal.
In many cases, however, estimates exist because
reliable measured data don’t. This is in part because
of decades of under-investment in local health infor-
mation systems, including by the very organisations
that now demand annual estimates. ‘Of the 40 or so
countries that account for 90% of child mortality,
only a handful have functioning vital statistics sys-
tems,’ noted a senior official from one international
organisation. ‘It’s borderline criminal for donors to
be bragging about anything having to do with data
when their billions have left that kind of legacy.’ In
weaker countries, running complex computer pro-
grammes to generate ‘data’ intended to fill informa-
tion gaps can form part of a vicious circle which leads
to ever weaker health information. If under-
resourced ministries of health, planning or finance
see apparently credible groups using computing
power to make up estimates in the absence of mea-
sured data, they are unlikely to invest in health infor-
mation systems. And without local engagement in
data collection and interpretation, there’s little chance
that data will be understood and integrated into local
systems of belief and action. It’s worth noting that
engaging data collectors in an active feedback loop
probably increases the technical validity of the data
also: nurses and other frontline workers who collect
and report the raw information on which estimates
should be based are more likely to fulfil that appar-
ently peripheral task diligently if they see the data
being used to improve service provision.
It is the process of engagement with different
actors, their institutional contexts, political impera-
tives and belief systems, that makes data socially
robust.
Aligning interests
In discussions around the utility and legitimacy of
health estimates, ‘inclusiveness’ is sometimes set in
opposition to ‘productivity’. In other words, the sort
of engagement that produces socially robust estimates
(inclusiveness) can undermine the timely production
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of technically accurate estimates (productivity). We
contend that the two are not opposed, because we
believe there is nothing productive about pumping
out technically credible data that are not used to
improve health. Social and political engagement are
not substitutes for technical validity, but are an inte-
gral component of data and knowledge that are
widely accepted and used.
The balance of emphasis may vary by setting,
because the different institutional imperatives of the
various data producers and users are not going to
disappear. However, we would argue that more inclu-
sive engagement could turn a vicious into a virtuous
circle, beginning with greater investment in local data
production, interpretation and use.
At the local and national levels, data producers must
first and foremost meet the data needs of the policy-
makers who decide how resources will be allocated
between local communities and health priorities. To do
that well, they must by definition engage with both the
policy-makers and the local communities; effective local
knowledge-generation processes are thus inherently the
most socially robust among those who make key deci-
sions. Much locally produced data can be aggregated
upwards to meet national and international needs. This
is not always the case, however. (Brazil, for example,
reports the percentage of women who have had seven
antenatal visits rather than the globally standardised
indicator based on four visits.) In this case engaging
international actors can lead either to acceptance by
supra-national bodies of local standards or to technical
and/or financial support for new data collection efforts,
where these would represent a benefit to local actors also.
At the international level, meaningful engage-
ment may slow the process, but it will improve the
result. The WHO and other international organisa-
tions are wary of prolonged consultation in part
because it disrupts the production schedule
demanded by their paymasters, and in part because
ministries of health often pressure them to publish
estimates deemed politically acceptable. We believe
that’s an argument for more consultation, not less.
The widest possible engagement, including with
academic institutions and civil society organisations
at the national level, protects against lopsided poli-
tical pressure. It also makes use of local knowledge;
that’s generally an improvement on the knowledge
generated by a globally standardised computer pro-
gramme. The experience in developing national and
sub-national HIV estimates, described by Mahy and
colleagues in this volume, provides strong evidence
of the effectiveness of this approach.
Achieving these changes would require the institu-
tions that demand internationally comparable data
from international organisations – mostly UN member
states and their development organisations but also
private foundations and multilateral health funds – to
recognise that socially robust processes may result in
slightly lower frequency and even somewhat less stan-
dardised measures, even as they lead to more use of
data to guide service provision locally and nationally.
We note that many richer nations do not themselves
report health data in the formats required of most low-
and middle-income nations, so they should have little
difficulty understanding the utility of local variation.
It is unclear how we should go about developing
socially robust processes in places where there are no
data at all, including in areas of conflict and failed
states. At the moment in these situations, we simply
make up figures with the help of computer models.
This does not seem useful: where there are no data,
there is unlikely to be the capacity or the will to act
on data produced with no reference to whatever
limited social or political structures may be in place.
If the international community is not willing or able
to work with local powers to develop health informa-
tion systems, then it should perhaps be willing to live
with blanks in its global disease estimates.
Systematic monitoring of the use of health data,
and further case studies of how information sys-
tems at different levels co-evolve and can be
strengthened, may help to guide efforts and invest-
ments, stimulate a virtuous cycle and enhance the
likelihood that research contributes to action.
Existing methods for monitoring the use of
research have been used in both high- and low-
income countries [37,42,43].
In summary, if we wish health estimates to be
used to improve health, then it is not enough to
publish technically robust indicators in journals
and the reports of international organisations.
Estimates must be arrived at through a process
that is understandable and relevant to the people
who can act on the data to improve health policies
and programmes. This requires ongoing interac-
tion, trust and a communicative infrastructure
that support genuine consultation and dialogue,
not just between producers of global estimates
and national health authorities, but within coun-
tries, between those who have knowledge to con-
tribute – very often groups with a stake in the
outcome, who are also in a position to promote
appropriate action.
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